Existing approaches to evaluating cyber risk are summarized and explored for their applicability to critical infrastructure. The approaches cluster in three different spaces: network security, cyber-physical, and mission assurance. In all approaches, some form of modeling is utilized at varying levels of detail, while the ability to understand consequence varies, as do interpretations of risk. A hybrid approach can account for cyber risk in critical infrastructure and allow for allocation of limited resources across the entirety of the risk spectrum.
INTRODUCTION
Presidential Policy Directive 21 defines sixteen critical infrastructure sectors [1] as shown in Figure 1 . The extent of the infrastructure captured in the sectors varies widely. Some sectors, such as dams, are narrowly defined. Others, such as energy, are broad with many subsectors including electric power, natural gas, and petroleum. Yet others represent a variety of industries such as defense industrial base and critical manufacturing.
Just as the sectors vary greatly, so does their level of cyber dependency. Banking and finance is closely coupled to the Internet and its information technology systems. Electric power in the energy sector has limited functionality without its control system. Oil and gas, also within the energy sector, is focused on cyber assets for monitoring of some elements and control of others. Sectors such as commercial facilities may rely on cyber assets for point of sales transactions and building control systems though the level of reliance will depend on the specific facility. To compound the difficulty in assessing and mitigating cyber risk, the level of cyber security knowledge and personnel also varies across sectors.
Figure 1. Sixteen Critical Infrastructure Sectors
All of the sectors have sector specific plans to address risk. These plans cover both cyber and physical risk, with cyber risk barely mentioned in some plans and others having more detailed plans for cyber risks. There is little consistency across sectors related to cyber dependence and cyber risk assessment.
RISK
Risk is a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence. There are three primary approaches to assessing cyber risk described in literature and used in practice: network security, cyber-physical, and mission. All of the approaches are fundamentally trying to manage risk. They vary in the portion of the risk equation they address, but are consistent across the three categories. While threat is discussed, none address threat directly. Tactics, techniques, and procedures, or capabilities, of adversaries are examined in attempts to address threat [2, 3] . The focus for protection is on the level of effort required for an adversary to achieve a goal and making that level of effort as high as possible by hardening systems. There is an implicit assumption that threat is out of the control of risk managers who, at best, can obstruct attacks well enough to limit them to highly sophisticated and wellCopyright is held by author/owner(s).
resourced adversaries, also known as the advanced persistent threat.
Network Security
Network security approaches assume that loss or compromise of the critical functions or elements of the system need to be controlled or avoided. This leads to the focus on network defense rather than on exploration of consequence. Consequence is not directly modeled in the majority of approaches and the focus is on controlling the vulnerability portion of risk by gaining a better understanding of the network and attempting to harden systems as much as possible. Hardening includes basic cyber security hygiene practices such as software updates and intrusion detection and protection.
Critical system elements or functions have been identified before security and vulnerability assessment begin. This may be a system that contains information that needs to be protected (confidentiality or integrity), or a network or device that always needs to be available (availability). This decision may not be explicit, just an assumption that the network or device is important and thus needs to be protected.
Network security uses a variety of modeling approaches that range in level of detail from packet-based simulations of network traffic to network graphs. Modeling techniques are employed to help secure networks to avoid disrupting an operational system whose goal may be availability. Techniques to explore vulnerabilities may break existing systems and render them unstable; working purely with a model eliminates the risk of system disruption and permits examination of vulnerabilities.
Modeling can also provide a unique look into the graph structure of networks and differing approaches to examining networks, whether the focus is on end points or on network traffic. Networks can be modeled based on the protocols used or the privileges invoked when data traverses a particular path. This becomes crucial in terms of knowing how to restrict the traversal of data or where to restrict users from having certain privileges. Modeling based on protocols or privileges provides insight into unnecessary protocols allowed on the networks and how the systems respond to malicious external requests. Packet-level models in the network security space focus on better characterizing attacks so that defenders can create better defense techniques such as improved firewall rules and intrusion detection algorithms. These models can also be used to enhance network analysis.
Network graphs are the starting point for many of the analyses in the network security realm. It may be an architectural diagram of the system as designed, or the current system as it existed the last time it was characterized At a minimum the diagram would represent the devices on the network and some concept of connectivity between them. A network graph can be developed to capture a variety of connections. For example, it may consist of nodes representing computer systems with either logical or physical links as edges. Alternately, computer system services may be the nodes, with edges mapping to the device that hosts those services. An example simple network graph is shown in Figure 2 . This sample graph consists of the external Internet, a firewall, two workstations and a database server.
Figure 2: Sample Network Graph
A graph called an attack graph is also frequently employed in the network security space. Attack graphs show the paths an attacker can use to gain access to a targeted network or achieve a particular goal on a system or network (for example, gaining access to what should be a protected database and downloading the data). The vertices of an attack graph can be divided into three partitions: starting places, "flags" or goals, and intermediate steps. They may contain alternative steps that could be taken to achieve a particular goal. Attack graphs are part of the security analysis of a system. They provide the system owner with information on vulnerabilities, impact and likelihood of successful attack.
A sample attack graph that corresponds with the sample network graph from Figure 2 is shown in Figure 3 . In this graph the attacker sends a phishing email which bypasses the firewall and is then opened by a user on one of the workstations. The attacker then uses a privilege escalation exploit on the workstation to sniff traffic and obtain the database server root password which is transmitted via cleartext. An alternate successful path of exploiting a database share is also shown. Paths without descriptions represent possible unsuccessful exploit pathways.
Figure 3. Sample Attack Graph
The majority of approaches in the network security space make several key assumptions that are critical to assessing vulnerability of the system: 1. A diagram of the network exists.
2. Critical system elements or functions have been identified.
3. Consequence is assumed.
Cyber-Physical
Cyber-physical systems are systems that integrate physical processes and computational components [4] . Modeling within the cyber-physical realm uses some of the methods found in network security but more deeply investigates consequence assessment, tying the cyber system to controlled physical assets. Much of the detailed modeling addresses the physical system rather than the control system. Where security of the control system is addressed, the focus is on broadening the network security-related work to apply, more specifically, to control systems.
There is a disconnect between risk management of the cyber system and risk management in the physical system. The systems tend to be addressed separately from the perspective of risk, with each side assuming away, or heavily simplifying the other portion of the system. That disconnect is reflected in personnel practices: cyber personnel and physical system personnel do not frequently work together.
The electric grid is the cyber-physical system that has received a great deal of attention and serves as an example of practices in this space.
Much of the cyber-physical modeling involves the power grid and more detailed models of the grid itself rather than of the control network. Studies exploring the control network tend to use attack graphs and some form of probabilistic assessment, similar to the network security spaces. The probabilities are then coupled with impact on the grid of component compromise. Impact is either calculated through detailed power flow models or through some measure of importance of that component in overall operations.
Significant work exists in attempts to tie attacks on the control network to detailed consequence on the power grid. The work tends to assume that if a control system component is compromised, its controlled device on the grid is negatively impacted (e.g., a breaker trip). Detailed power flow modeling is done in many cases to determine what that may mean to overall grid performance.
Mission
Mission assurance is a field in which cyber systems are treated as enabling a particular function. The focus of the work is to determine impact on a mission or process due to the loss of supporting information technology infrastructure and to try to ensure mission function. Functional or process diagrams are used to tie the cyber asset to its corresponding space in achieving the mission or function.
Given that cyber security perimeter defenses can never be perfect, cyber risk needs to account for the dependencies between the cyber system and the overall mission that cyber system is helping to achieve [5] . Mission assurance ties cyber assets into some form of consequence on the larger system. This is very similar to risk analysis in the cyber-physical space, though mission assurance also tends to explore mitigations. Network security typically does not discuss system consequence.
Many of the techniques used in mission assurance are similar to the cyber security aspects of network security and the goal of determining the impact on the system found in cyber-physical practices. Similar to cyber-physical, the cyber system in many cases is not simulated in great detail, while significant effort is put into exploring the impact portion. Mitigation of impact could involve removing cyber assets from the critical path of the mission, or making compromise of those assets less relevant to the mission.
A HYBRID APPROACH
Risk is a function of threat, vulnerability, and consequence and an approach that adopts elements from network security, cyberphysical, and mission assurance is needed to adequately address cyber risk in critical infrastructures.
In network security practice, the focus is analysis of vulnerability and threat in combination. Threat in the form of intent is not considered. Threat is explored through examining the capability of the attacker, and making network asset exploitation as difficult as possible. To achieve this, a combination of asset-based security and network security practices are used. These include better intrusion detection techniques and use of monitoring and countermeasures. For vulnerability analysis, the cyber-physical realm has adopted many of the practices used in the network security space such as attack graphs and analysis of network topologies. Having an accurate network topology is critically important to risk management and the ability to conduct the assessments.
Critical infrastructures could better manage cyber risk by adopting the approaches used in mission assurance and cyber-physical analyses to link cyber assets to functions and processes. Functional process diagrams can be used to tie functional elements to cyber systems and assets. With that information, risk managers can make better decisions about what portions of the network are most critical to functions and then apply network security practices with additional focus on those areas. In addition, tying risk to impacts on functions or processes allows risk managers to move beyond defensive measures into more proactive measures that could help mitigate consequence and ensure process survivability. Rather than prioritizing only the criticality of cyber assets, risk managers can weigh costs and benefits to prioritize resources by mission and the assets and systems tied to that mission.
In order to achieve the goal of including cyber risk in risk management decisions, two areas are critical: controlling vulnerability and understanding consequence. Both of these areas can benefit from practices in network security, cyber-physical and mission assurance efforts.
Control vulnerability
To control vulnerability, the network must be understood and characterized. It is difficult to manage unknown elements; therefore, the creation of a network graph is required. A comprehensive graph should include hardware and software assets, connectivity between assets, and asset configuration and known vulnerabilities. In addition, traffic analysis can be used to identify systems or connections that should not be part of the network.
Once the network graph is developed, attack graphs can also be created to explore potential network attacks and their prevention. Attack graphs need to consider the level of capability of the adversary of concern.
Once these initial steps are taken, the risk manager can proceed to understanding the consequence of the loss or compromise of various cyber assets to the function or process being considered.
Understand consequence
Cyber networks and assets need to be mapped to functional processes in order for consequence to be assessed. Functional process diagrams can be used to create this mapping. A functional process diagram involves identifying key processes and the physical and cyber assets that support those processes, along with the connections that allow the system to move through the process. If the process is sufficiently complex, a model can be used to evaluate cyber asset or cyber systems disruption, manipulation, or information loss. Availability, integrity, and/or confidentiality can be incorporated as a requirement of the processes.
To manage risk across infrastructures that are geographically diverse or comprise systems that exist in different divisions, the functional process diagrams must include processes that cross divisional boundaries in an organization. Otherwise, attempts to prioritize resources to manage cyber risks will only capture individual division priorities and not speak to overarching missions. This can be achieved by divisions creating functional process diagrams where elements that enter and leave the process are treated as inputs from and outputs to other divisions. Integrating the diagrams from each division would create a holistic picture.
The level of integration with partners from a cyber exposure and risk perspective, can also be included in the evaluation but inputs or outputs to those partners are external to the process diagram. Risk exposure related to cloud resources can also be addressed in this manner. Once the risk of putting process elements or processes into the cloud has been examined and accepted, cloud resources can become inputs and outputs that are external to the process.
Summary
The complete picture of the cyber system coupled with its processes allows a risk manager to prioritize cyber systems and assets based on the missions they support, and determine which cyber components are most critical to the execution of those missions. The risk manager can also look at the cost-benefit tradeoffs of either further securing those elements or creating mitigations so consequence is reduced. This allows the risk manager to assume that their defenses are not (and never will be) perfect, and look for additional options that provide benefit in terms of the organization accomplishing its mission under the conditions of a successful attack.
Since resources for protection are limited, having an approach that ties cyber risk to consequence on the system allows the risk manager to conduct tradeoffs between cyber threats and other hazards. This allows resources to be applied where they are needed most and best able to protect the mission of the system.
